I.
I deploy wde reflectve equlbrum [WRE] prncpally as a method of justfica-* Departments of Phlosophy, Unversty of Calgary/Concorda Unversty. I would lke to thank the two anonymous referees for ther perceptve and helpful comments. I have tred to respond to them, especally n the Addendum.
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ton for accounts of moralty and normatve poltcal and socal theory. Here I shall be prmarly concerned wth how to use t where poltcal moralty s beng thought about. WRE s a coherentst method of justficaton. It starts wth a socety's or a cluster of socetes' most firmly held specfic partcular consdered judgments or consdered convctons and seeks to forge them nto a consstent and coherent whole along wth other consdered judgments (judgments at all levels of generalty) and as well wth other relevant belefs that are generally reasonably, uncontestedly and wdely held n the socety or cluster of socetes wth whch we are concerned. It s a coherentst method but wth the unque feature -some would say a conflctng feature -that some initial credblty s taken to obtan for those consdered judgments themselves that we reflectvely endorse and take as our startng ponts. Ther ntal credblty wll gan n strength for those consdered judgments when they get wnnowed out as we proceed n equlbratng and contnue to be reflectvely endorsed at the pont where (for a tme) we make closure. What we contnue reflectvely to endorse after such an exercse has consderable weght wth us. But these ntal consdered judgments themselves that we reflectvely endorse are not lke logcal atoms or protocol sentences; for n the very fact of beng considered and beng reflectively endorsed they cannot stand alone, and ther ntal credblty obtans not ndependently of the relatons they have wth some other belefs and convctons. Wthout that they could not even be understood to be somethng we could consder or to be the result of reflectve endorsement. However, wthout such initial credblty, a purely coherentist method (assumng -what s problematcal -that there could be one) would be subject to the standard objecton that vews may be as coherent as you lke but wthout havng any warrant at all, e.g., the belef systems of Chrstan Scentsts or flat earthers.
The thng s to seek to maxmze the coherence of our moral belefs and practces by forgng them nto reflectve equlbrum. It should be a wde (broad) reflectve equlbrum and not a narrow (partal) one because beyond collectng together moral judgments, moral practces, medum -level moral rules and moral prncples nto a coherent whole t also needs to take nto account well justfied and wdely accepted emprcal factual belefs ncludng belefs about the functons of moralty, the functonng of parts of the socal structure (ncludng the economy) relevant to socal facts, poltcal realtes, and relevant scentfic developments. WRE, that s, does not work n a moral or socal vacuum. How the world goes s not taken to be rrelevant to how moralty goes. We seek an equlbrum whch takes nto account matters such as I have just mentoned, ncludng ascertanng the extent and ntractablty of the pluralsm n our modern lberal socetes and whether and to what extent the comprehensve vews extant n our socetes (or at least some of them) are reasonable. And where some are not, as s most certanly the case, we seek to determne whch ones (f any) are such that t would be reasonably possble to (ratonally) persuade people holdng those unreasonable vews to be reasonable thereby abandonng ther unreasonable vews and, by dong so, movng us along n the drecton of a more well-ordered socety. We seek to obtan a consstent cluster of moral, poltcal, uncontroversal factual, and uncontroversal theoretcal belefs that would yeld the best avalable
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account of what our socal stuaton s, what the reasonable possbltes are n the socety, and what s reasonable and desrable to do. As a bt of deal theory ths s a reasonable thng to say, but whether t has much resonance n the hurly burly of our moral and poltcal lves s very much another matter.
No WRE wll be uncondtonally final: the 'last word' wrtten n stone. We can be confident that all equlbra wll eventually be upset as the world changes ncludng people's perceptons of the world and ther reactons to t. However, the method s self-correcting and t s reasonable to hope that f WRE s appled wth care, ntegrty, and ntellgence that later equlbra bult on earler ones wll tend to be more adequate: that s render more thoroughly and more perspcuously the consstency and coherence of our moral belefs and practces. But there s no escapng fallblsm (Hume's mtgated sceptcsm f you wll), hstorcsm, or fintsm. We never get an equlbrum whch says t all, whch finally sums thngs up n a way whch s complete and yelds a moral vew of thngs that s certan and uncondtonally vald. We do not even understand, except perhaps n the vaguest terms, what t would be lke to get such a thng.
II.
Idl Boran and Andrew Lster have launched ncsve crtques of my account of WRE. They am at a place where I may be mportantly vulnerable, though I should note n passng that t would not make for trouble as well for the WRE accounts of John Rawls, Norman Danels or T.M. Scanlon.
1 It has to do wth my rather sngular and, as some may regard, my ncoherent or at least deeply mstaken, desre to have my Rawls and Rchard Rorty too. As a headng to hs artcle, Lster approprately quotes me as sayng, "Moral, socal and poltcal phlosophy should travel metaphyscally and epstemologcally lght for both Rawlsan and Rortyan reasons whch are dfferent but do not conflct."
2 He then challenges the clam that they do not conflct and ndeed goes on to add that they do not only conflct but conflct n a revealng and mportant way.
3 He made the followng remark n hs crtque of me at a conference n honour of me.
WRE s a nonfoundatonalst method of justficaton n ethcs. Two knds of consderatons motvate the development of such a method: a Rortyan denal of the exstence of phlosophcal foundatons for knowledge clams and socal practces, and a Rawlsan attempt to avod appeals to controversal relgous, metaphyscal or phlosophcal deas n the justficaton of socal nsttutons. In the openng quote [the above quote] Nelsen clams that these two motvatons do not con-flct. However, the Rortyan reason for not makng foundatonalst clams s that they are ndefensble or ncoherent, whereas the Rawlsan reason s that they wll nevtably be a matter of deep, reasonable controversy for the desgn of socal nsttutons. The Rawlsan seeks to avod the whole debate between foundatonalsm and ant-foundatonalsm, and so would not defend WRE on Rortyan grounds. 4 Boran, as well as Lster, rghtly clam that the two types of justficatory appeal for WRE are dfferent and mportantly so. Boran s also correct n assertng that f ther am were the same or mportantly smlar they would be conflctng. She also gves ample evdence that n prevous wrtngs I have not kept them properly apart. And she s justfied n sayng that Rawls would not, and ndeed could not, aval hmself of the Rortyan justficaton for appealng to WRE. If he dd, Rawls would be volatng hs own restrctons on justfyng poltcal lberalsm wthout makng any controversal phlosophcal clams or moves whatsoever. Rejectng foundatonalsm and takng an ant-foundatonalst or even a non-foundatonalst stance s one such controversal clam. Perhaps t s well justfied (ndeed, I thnk so) but t s controversal. It s metaphyscal as Rawls uses 'metaphysical' in a broad sense to desgnate any controversal phlosophcal vew.
5 Rawls, n defendng poltcal lberalsm and n usng WRE to defend t, does not crtcze or reject foundatonalsm or adopt non-foundatonalsm but just bengnly sets asde such ssues.
However, WRE s a procedure and t can be used for dfferent purposes. Rawls uses t for one purpose, as descrbed above, and Rorty and I use t for dfferent purposes but purposes that do not conflct wth Rawls's. (Indeed, I also use t for Rawls's purposes.) Rawls's deployment of WRE s, I shall argue, safe and home just as he deploys t for his quite legitimate purposes. But hs purposes are not the only legtmate purposes for whch WRE can be deployed even when only poltcal lberalsm s at ssue. And some other deployments of WRE do not operate wth the same constrants. I shall try to make these dark sayngs clear and hopefully persuasve. In speakng of 'vared uses of WRE' I mean that ths procedure can be deployed for dfferent ends or purposes. It can be used n scence, logc, metaethcs, epstemology, aesthetcs, and even metaphyscs, as well as poltcs, and moral phlosophy. It tres to get n these dfferent domans, and artculated n a coherent way, a coherent account n whch ther varous most firmly held belefs (and n some cases convctons) are shown to fit together consstently and coherently.
Where (f at all) a poltcal system (conservatsm, poltcal lberalsm, a herarchcal corporatsm, socalsm, communsm, fascsm) can make a clam to justficaton, the judgments that for t are ts consdered belefs or (n some cases) consdered convctons must be forgeable nto a consstent and coherent set or whole. Ths s a necessary but not a sufficent condton for an adequate justficaton. The consdered judgments that get equlbrated must also be thought to have some ntal credblty by the people who accept that belef system. And ndeed they must have some initial credblty, at least for them. Many phlosophers (as well as others) wll want more. But t s, I beleve, an lluson to thnk that they can get more.
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Wide Reflective Equilibria 223 and T.M. Scanlon), how Rawls came to have, partcularly from hs Dewey lectures on and culmnatng n Political Liberalism and The Law of Peoples, a very constraned but creatvely determnate purpose. 7 He saw that the extant defenses of poltcal lberalsm (socal democracy f you wll) had nternal conflcts: conflcts that ts adherents had not been able ether to resolve or plausbly dssolve.
8
He set out to present a way of understandng poltcal lberalsm that would enable us to see t as somethng free of those conflcts: free most centrally of conflcts between lberty and equalty and of any entrenched conflct between the lbertes of the ancents and the lbertes of the moderns and how there was n poltcal lberalsm a concepton of tolerance that made sense of poltcal lberals' relatons to non-lberal peoples and dd not come to ethnocentrcally imposing lberal vews on them. Hs am was, takng t as gven that poltcal lberalsm was an attractve vew to whch he and many others were commtted, to artculate an account of poltcal lberalsm that could plausbly be seen to be a consstent and coherent vew that was perspcuously dsplayable. Rawls sought to artculate a vew, takng nto account the vared comprehensve doctrnes of lberals n such democraces, whch yelded an overlappng consensus concernng our political lves together. One very central element of t was to be commtted to the toleraton of conflctng metaphyscal and relgous or non-relgous comprehensve conceptons of how lfe s to be lved, no matter how deep their conflicting metaphysical and religious or non-religious beliefs, as long as, in the very minimal sense Rawls had in mind, these various comprehensive views of the good were reasonable. If ths obtans for them they wll come to agree on a commonly acceptable famly of conceptons of a broadly egaltaran concepton of poltcal justce.
9 In achevng such a WRE to utlze for hs defence of poltcal lberalsm and for a defence of lberal socetes (whch also must be consttutonal democraces) he artculated, at least arguably, a vew, gven the pervasve and ntractable debates about lberal democraces, that was a very consderable achevement ndeed.
10
It s very mportant to see how minimal ths sense of beng reasonable s and how keepng t so s essental for ganng agreement concernng and reflectve endorsement of the adequacy of hs concepton of poltcal lberalsm. But t s also mportant to keep firmly n mnd a pont Rawls makes hmself that justficaton s always for a partcular audence at a partcular tme and not ever for humanty Rawls's justficaton of poltcal lberalsm s an internal one, makng mnmal clams on those committed to political liberalism and who accept ts orentaton and the ethos of ts background culture, but who wll often have very dfferent comprehensve conceptons of the good. Startng wth ther consdered judgments, concernng whch he beleves there s a consderable consensus among lberals, Rawls sought to get ther vews nto WRE. He dd not seek to show (though he also dd not deny or affirm that t could be done) that poltcal lberalsm could be justfied to someone tryng to advocate some form of an arstocratc herarchcal socety, a Lennst communst socety or a fascst socety, or to someone tryng to advocate a serf or even a slave socety. And he dd not clam to have arguments sufficent to turn ther mnds around f they would be reasonable. Rawls was not concerned to present an argument that would requre for everyone, f they would be ratonal, to turn ther heads around -or to re-attune ther hearts -and become poltcal lberals. Though he, lke most of us n our socetes, thought some of these non-lberal vews, whch were also llberal, were very mplausble and n some nstances evl. But Rawls dd not thnk that anyone, anywhere, no matter what hs stuaton and partcular socalzaton and culture, would recognze, or have grounds for acceptng, justce as farness or any of the related famly of poltcally lberal poltcal conceptons of justce. He was not n the busness of answerng Calvn or Luther or Netzsche or Karl Schmdt or Lenn or Marx or fundamentalsts of any strpe. He dd not say that t could not be done or that t could be done or even that t should be done, but rather gave to understand that that was not hs task. He sought nstead to present poltcal lberalsm n a coherent way and to convncngly show how he could make t coherent and plausble even to poltcal lberals aware of the dfficultes n extant lberal accounts. To do ths he crucally and dstnctvely deployed WRE. He deployed t n a manner that travelled phlosophcally lght, taking no positions at all that were philosophically controversial. He dd not deny there may be a deep, contested truth or soundness n poltcal lberalsm, but responded that the person commtted to poltcal lberalsm need not nvoke or even grasp such a truth or soundness (f ndeed there s one) to acheve agreement wth other poltcal Vol. 26(2) Wide Reflective Equilibria 225 lberals who hold very dfferent metaphyscal and epstemologcal vews. For example, a secularst poltcal lberal could say to a Thomst poltcal lberal, 'Perhaps you are rght. There may be natural moral laws rooted n God's reason and they may be the ultimate ground for our shared consdered judgments. But I, along wth a not nconsderable number of reasonable others, do not agree wth you about that and I, as well as others -reasonable others -even after consderable argument and dalogue, are not very lkely to come to agree wth you about these philosophical matters. But there s agreement between us -between you and me -about a whole host of consdered judgments themselves. So wherever the phlosophcal quest may take us, for political purposes -for our attanng a common poltcal ratonale for our poltcal lberalsm -we can, and should, bracket such controversal phlosophcal questons. We can for political purposes bengnly neglect them, even f we, when we are phlosophzng, seek to ascertan the truth -f you wll, the warranted assertablty -concernng what we severally and dfferently and perhaps rreconclably, gven the burdens of judgment, dsagree about concernng what we are to take to be the deep ultmate bass or lack thereof for our allegance to poltcal lberalsm.' To expect agreement about these controversal philosophical matters -n Rawls's terms, metaphyscal matters -s utterly unrealstc; but t s not unreasonable or mplausble to expect agreement concernng a whole host of commonsense consdered convctons and belefs and about how they fit together.
It s mportant to recognze, as Rawls stresses hmself, and Boran rghtly reterates, that ths s not to be confused wth a sceptcsm (say, a Macke-type error theory) or a Rorty-lke ant-foundatonalsm or Rorty's and my ant-Phlosophy phlosophy or even (as, s evdent, he commts hmself to n hs Dewey lectures) a Rawlsan meta-ethcal Kantan constructvsm. 12 We smply bracket these thngs when what s at ssue s an internal poltcal justficaton of poltcal lberalsm n an attempt to make t plausble to people who are already poltcal lberals but worry about ts ratonale or even ts consstency.
However, 'beng bracketed from' s one thng and 'beng ncompatble wth' s 12 'Ant-Phlosophy phlosophy' wll sound wlfully paradoxcal wthout some explanaton. It rests on a dstncton Rorty draws n hs book: Consequences of Pragmatism (Mnneapols: Unversty of Mnnesota Press, 1982) at xv-xx. Rorty wrtes, "'phlosophy' lke 'truth' and 'goodness' s ambguous." A lttle 'p' 'phlosophy' can mean smply what Wlfred Sellars calls "an attempt to see how thngs, n the broadest sense of the term, hang together n the broadest sense of the term." Here talk of 'phlosophy' s at least reasonably unproblematcal and many people -George Ellot or Thomas Hardy, for example -who are normally not thought of as phlosophers are n that sense phlosophers, and sometmes much more so than some of the professonals. Phlosophy (wth a bg P) denotes somethng more specal such as the metaphyscal and epstemologcal actvty characterstc of Plato and Kant as well as ther contemporary hers, such as Krpke and Davd Lews. Ths Rorty regards as a very dubous actvty, ndeed up for Wttgenstenan dssoluton. But whether that s so or not, t remans mportant to dstngush phlosophy and Phlosophy. One mght be for the former wthout beng for the latter, and f ant-Phlosophy phlosophy s on the mark, as both Rorty and I thnk t s, then one should be for undermnng Phlosophy and for practcng phlosophy. another. For hs partcular purposes -fundamentally poltcal purposes -Rawls cannot appeal to what has been called (I thnk mstakenly) epstemologcal/Rortyan reasons or any controversal epstemologcal reasons or ant-epstemologcal stance or anythng else phlosophcally controversal. They are not part of the language-game Rawls s playng n defendng poltcal lberalsm; they are not the practces he utlzes n seekng to place poltcal n hs WRE. But a poltcal lberal who wants to answer Karl Schmdt or Aqunas or Mao or Lenn s playng another importantly different language-game, also dstnctvely poltcally lberal, but for a dfferent but (or so I clam) non -conflctng purpose. To gve an internal poltcal justficaton of poltcal lberalsm -to show how poltcal lberalsm plausbly hangs together -s one thng, and to gve an external poltcal justficaton of poltcal lberalsm -showng ts superorty to herarchcal arstocratc systems or to fascsm or Sovet Unon style communsm n Statist post-captalsm -s another. These tasks are not the same tasks but just dfferent tasks wth dfferent ends n vew. Ths s not to show or to say that they stand n conflct or to gve any credblty to that clam.
III.
Wth the above I am nchng closer to showng how I can consstently and coherently have my Rawls and Rorty too. They are playng dfferent language -games for dfferent purposes but not, for all of that, conflctng purposes, or at least not necessarly conflctng purposes. I dd not say 'ncommensurable' purposes but just 'dfferent' purposes. Or to use a dfferent jargon, they, n askng about the justficaton (perhaps better, 'a justficaton') of poltcal lberalsm, have what John Dewey calls dfferent ends in view.
13 Rawls wants an internal justficaton of poltcal lberalsm showng how t hangs together, how t s a consstent and coherent vew meshng wth our consdered judgements. . But he nether affirms nor denes that an external justficaton s possble. Rorty presumably wants the same thng, but he s concerned as well wth an external justficaton of poltcal lberalsm. He s concerned wth how, f pushed, poltcal lberalsm could respond to a Karl Schmdt or a Lenn. Hs own examples are Netzsche and Loyola but the ssue remans the same. 14 Rorty gves hs contextualst, hstorcst, fintst, socal practce -orented, f you wll, Wttgenstenan answer. 15 We never can gan, he argues, some standpont where we can, standng free from any perspectve, neutrally assess such matters. It s unntellgble to try to set asde all our socal practces and gan a perspectveless vew from nowhere -say, Sdgwck-style from 'the pont of vew of the unverse'-where we can come to see that some regmes of practces are justfied and others are not. (However, Rawls could not take such vews for they are controversal phlosophcal vews and thus for hm metaphyscal vews. 
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He seems n hs later thought to be n practce very much a hstorcst, though he would not say ths. He could not acknowledge that, for t would be or so t seems nconsstent wth hs eschewng what he takes to be metaphyscal vews n argung for poltcal lberalsm. That s a way, as Rorty does and as I do, to characterze hs vews -I thnk an accurate way -but Rawls need not do so hmself n showng how poltcal lberalsm hangs together.) But t would be harder for hm n characterzng what justficaton conssts n, namely that t s somethng that obtans for a certan people at a certan tme and place and for people wth certan nterests. That notwthstandng, poltcal lberalsm, fascsm, Stalnst 'communsm', Calvnsm, Loyolasm, the varous relgous fundamentalsms, are just not for Rawls on the agenda. But holders of such deeply llberal vews wll return the complment. For some the very word 'lberal' s a derogatory term. A lberal can, of course, gve a bucketful of reasons for rejectng these llberal vews. They are ntolerant, fanatcal, show a knd of dsrespect for persons, an ndfference to lberty, cause extensve msery, have (n some nstances) rratonal conceptons of what the world s lke, etc. etc. But such remarks wll not faze the llberal opposton. These reasons are all, they affirm, queston-beggng. They (dependng on what knd of an llberal s nvolved) wll say these secularly orented poltcal lberal responses gnore the utter transcendence of God and the unquestonable unchallengeable authorty of Hs law or the wsdom of the Führer and hs call for the racal soldarty rooted n 'racal scence' and the purty of hs New Order or the hstorcal realty of the proletarat and the clear practcal understandng by them that captalsm wll break down of ts own nternal contradctons, somethng shown to the proletarat (and only to them) n the turmol of ther everyday lfe and so on and so on. (Ths latter s somethng that Georg Lukács argued).
16
Poltcal lberals wll not say or even thnk, as when pushed very far extreme llberals wll, that 'I have the rght to persecute you because I am rght and you are wrong. I have the truth and you do not. My belefs are true and yours, and mportantly and dangerously so, are not, and I must do everythng I can to see to t that my vews preval.' Moreover, any uncorrupted person, an llberal could go on to say, can see that or ndeed any rght thnkng person can see that. Such an extreme llberal (and they are plentful) wll add: 'Gven those corrupt vews of yours or patently false vews of yours, there are no good reasons for beng tolerant of you, except perhaps sometmes tactical reasons of expedency when the balance of forces outwegh us.' Many of them wll say (and dfferently for dfferent llberal vews) 'We cannot by any means respect or even tolerate Tutss, Muslms, Jews, Hndus, Chrstans, Communsts, Fascsts or athests.' Tolerance for llberals has at best nstrumental value only and need not be rooted n respect for persons. They may even be so fanatcal, as Naz deologues were, to beleve that some lfe s unworthy of lfe. Here the lberal very well may feel wth Wttgensten that justficaton has come to an end and that hs spade s turned. Our vews of lfe and ts worth, he may well feel, are so dfferent from those of that collecton of llberals that nothng further can be sad.
Other poltcal lberals, John Dewey for example or myself, wll thnk that nqury and justficaton never come to a dead stop such that, even after a perod of coolng off and reflecton , nothng more can possibly, relevantly be sad. Moreover, f that was so, we could not know that t s so, whch s tantamount to sayng t never comes to an end. Rorty wll say, as I would as well, that whatever 'answer' there s, f any, we can never escape fallblsm, perspectvsm, hstorcsm, and fintsm. There are no gants or gods or an absolute perspectve -some vew from nowhere, some pont of vew of the unverse. Whatever s sad at a gven tme may be upset at a later tme. There s no uncondtonal valdty, no Archmedean pont, and no ahstorcal perch. There s, that s, no escapng perspectvsm. (But s ths not, however well justfied, to take what Rawls would regard as a metaphyscal vew? Do we need to do ths to show the coherence of poltcal lberalsm?) I thnk we do. Justficaton s tme-dependent though truth s not. But there s no attanng truth, as dstnct as t s from some tme dependent as warranted assertablty, let alone The Truth, whatever (f anythng) that means. We can only gan, wth luck and careful reasonng, warranted assertablty for a partcular tme and place. But we can sometmes get that and that s not nothng. And that s somethng that we can reasonably commt ourselves to.
Justficatons of truth-clams arsng from our varous nqures may appear to be, and perhaps actually are, more adequately justfied than the ones that came before them or some other purported justficatons that are contemporaneous wth them. But convergence here s nether nevtable nor assured beyond reasonable doubt. The most we can hope for s the best justfied belef we can for a tme get. But that, to repeat, s always tme and place dependent. We can never gan some history transcendent viewpoint where we just have the truth or somethng that s warrantedly assertable period.
Many, perhaps most, poltcal lberals wll take ths to heart and draw the consequences n a way people holdng llberal vewponts generally do not. Many poltcal lberals may come to see that there s no escapng perspectvsm and wth t a hstorcsm, fintsm, and fallblsm -Hume's mtgated sceptcsm, f you wll. Many poltcal lberals may come wth that understandng to see -though some may contnue to thnk ths s a bt too extreme -that though we can have reasons for what we do or thnk they can never be more than hstorcst/fallblst reasons. Ths, of course, s a contestable and contested phlosophcal poston that Rawls, gven hs own methodologcal commtments, must bracket as he also must bracket assertng the opposte. They are both what he calls metaphyscal vews.
Such a hstorcsm shows ts head n clams concernng how to argue (f poltcal lberals choose to do so) about the relatve merts of poltcal lberalsm vs -à-vs the range of llberal or non-lberal vews. We cannot escape assumng ths or some other contestable phlosophcal poston n argung wth ths assortment of llberals. But Rawls resolutely refuses to take any such argumentatve route. But to take such a controversal argumentatve route, as Rorty does or I do, n tryng to answer the questons concernng how to answer a Karl Schmdt, does not conflct wth Rawls's avodance of metaphyscs (for hm, remember, any controversal phlosophcal vew). It s just (to repeat) that they are dfferent thngs -ndeed dfferent thngs that a consstent poltcal lberal may legtmately do -wth dfferent ratonales for dfferent purposes. Rawls tres to justfy
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Wide Reflective Equilibria 229 poltcal lberalsm internally by showng how t can be a consstently, perspcuously, and attractvely arranged poston wthout departng from the consdered convctons that all poltcal lberals could accept. Hs am s to show how poltcal lberalsm can be rendered consstent and coherent. I seek n addton to defend t n competton wth and from challenges from varous llberal vews and partcularly from the strongest ones that can be mustered.
It s mportant to recognze that n both Rawls-type arguments and n Rortytype arguments for poltcal lberalsm "WRE s employed" and "ts core s the same thng." It s the same procedure. It functons wth deeply embedded belefs and consdered judgments at all levels (partcularly those most characterstc of the background culture of poltcal lberalsm). In dong so t attempts to forge a consstent and coherent (perhaps ths comes to the same thng) set of belefs nto a coherent and perspcuously dsplayed whole that wll yeld both an explanaton and a justficaton of the relevant phenomena. Yet some WREs, whle n that respect the same, wll be dfferent n havng dfferent objectves, sometmes usng partially dfferent consdered judgments and belefs as 'raw materal.' They wll use the same procedures but utlze some dfferent belefs n ther dfferent WREs. Ths even obtans concernng an attempt to justfy poltcal lberalsm. Some, as I have sad, seek an internal justficaton and some wll seek an external one and some, as I do, (perfectly consstently) wll seek both. (Those who seek external justficaton wll presuppose poltcal lberalsm's coherence.) The consdered judgments to be forged nto a coherent whole wll, n some sgnficant nstances, be dfferent dependng on whch type of justficaton s at ssue. In a Rawls-type justficaton of poltcal lberalsm all the consdered judgments placed n WRE must be phlosophcally (n hs sense metaphyscally) neutral and must be acceptable to all those who partake of the ethos of poltcal lberalsm. Remember ths type of justficaton s an internal one attemptng to show how poltcal lberalsm can be shown to form a consstent, coherent and attractve whole. The Rorty-type justficaton wll also collect together all the same type of consdered judgments, but wll as well have contested-type phlosophcal clams to be fitted together wth the non-contested consdered judgments n that WRE. Those contested phlosophcal prncples are those t s necessary to deploy to relevantly respond to varous llberal or non -lberal clams so as not to just beg the queston wth them. But both have WRE arguments utlzng a common method. It should also be noted that the varous llberal or non-lberal postons could themselves deploy at least some narrow reflectve equlbrum n a consstent way. For them, however, the move to WRE s more problematc. Some such llberal or non-lberal peoples lvng under condtons of modernty wll have a number of what they regard as well-establshed theoretcal emprcal belefs and other emprcal clams that they would at best have a hard tme consstently accommodatng n ther WRE.
17 Ths wll not be true, or at least less lkely to be true, of poltcal lberals. But, gnorng such modernst and enlghtenment clams, they perhaps could manage coherence as well as a poltcal lberal f such non-lberals restrict themselves to a narrow reflectve equlbrum. But wth hs WRE the poltcal lberal could appeal to some often mundane uncontroversal belefs that llberals and other non-lberals also accept. But there are belefs n hs WRE whch are not compatble wth other belefs or consdered judgements of such non-lberals whle they are compatble wth the full range of the poltcal lberal's vews. 18 We should not forget, moreover, that the method of WRE was used by Nelson Goodman n epstemology (or what was so labelled; perhaps 'non -foundatonalst epstemology' s not an oxymoron).
19 If we balk at such an 'epstemology,' regardng t as a non-subject, we can call t 'theory of nqury' or just plan 'nqury' nstead.
20 It was also in effect used n the phlosophy of scence by Qune and I have used t to attempt to show that at least thestc relgons could not, under condtons of modernty, be n WRE, for too many thestc relgous belefs conflct wth well-establshed scentfic belefs. 21 We cannot get for we moderns a WRE here.
22 But for Jews, Chrstans, and Muslms lvng in the Middle Ages, ther belefs could perhaps have been forged nto partally dfferent, but not completely dfferent, WREs for each wth ther dstnctve deas of redempton. Somethng lke ths also may even be true for solated and margnalzed groups n our tme such as the Amsh and Huttertes.
However, the general pont s that WRE could, and perhaps should, be used for the full range of belef-systems or forms of lfe or conceptons of thngs from phlosophy of mathematcs to thnkng about scence, relgon, moralty, poltcs, law, to socety more generally, to aesthetcs. The same core coherentst method -a dstnctve procedure -would be appled n all domans. Sometmes what are appealed to are consdered judgments, sometmes mathematcal trusms, sometmes wdely acknowledged emprcal data and well-establshed hypotheses, and, for some peoples n some stuatons, relgous belefs and doctrnes and ther assocated consdered judgments, and sometmes a mx of some of these thngs. Sometmes WRE seeks only explanaton or only justficaton and sometmes both. But always there s a smlar procedure. But to return to Rawls's, Rorty's and my dspute about poltcal lberalsm, there s a dfference between some of the sorts of reasons that get appealed to, but there s no conflct between them, given they have different ends in view, concernng the justficaton of poltcal lberalsm. Moreover, they all utlze the same core method of WRE. I can consstently have my Rorty and Rawls too.
IV.
In the above I have used 'reasonable,' as does Rawls, Scanlon and Barry, lavshly, perhaps too lavshly. I, lke Rawls, do not assume or thnk 'the reasonable' 
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Wide Reflective Equilibria 231 can be derved from 'the ratonal' (let alone be dentfied wth t) or that 'the ratonal' s a more basc concept that we need to make sense of 'the reasonable.' Both concepts are essental n socal lfe or ndeed lfe perod. But they have dfferent uses.
I want now to explore a bt of Rawls's use of 'the reasonable' for I thnk t s mportant not only for ts own sake but for understandng what s at ssue between Boran and myself. In dong so I shall brng out an mportant but neglected aspect of Rawls's thought that helps, f thought through, to further my case that we can and should deploy a case for poltcal lberalsm along Rortyan lnes n one context as well as to hold steady Rawls's manner of argung for t n another. Both contexts have ther dstnctve mportance.
In elucdatng what he means by 'reasonable,' Rawls does not "define the reasonable drectly," but specfies "two of ts basc aspects as virtues of persons."
23
[emphass added] The first "basc aspect of the reasonable … s the wllngness to propose far terms of cooperaton and to abde by them provded others do." 24 Rawls makes t clear that he s not askng people to be suckers. The norms they propose they honestly must beleve are "reasonable for everyone to accept and therefore are justfiable to them …." 25 And they are prepared to reason wth others about them. They are open to the varous norms beng so proposed and take t as somethng that must also be open to reasonable others. (Those who are not so open wll not n that crucal sense count as 'reasonable.') They must, as well, f they are reasonable, be prepared "to dscuss the far terms that others propose."
26 They have the dea that the reasonable s an element of the dea of socety as a system of far cooperaton and that ts far terms must be those that are reasonable for all to accept and that they ndeed generally wll be accepted n lberal socetes. Ths s a crucal part of our very dea of recprocty.
27 If these condtons are volated, the practce of reasonng together reasonably s off. Someone commtted to reasonableness should not make a sucker out of herself or just take the badgerng of the unreasonable.
The second basc aspect of 'the reasonable,' and the most mportant aspect for the restrctons Rawls puts on the types of clams to be utlzed n hs dstnctve defence of poltcal lberalsm, "s the wllngness to recognze the burdens of judgment and to accept ther consequences for the use of publc reason n drectng the legtmate exercse of poltcal power n a consttutonal regme." 28 We need to get clear about what Rawls calls the burdens of judgment, and why t s so mportant for hm, ncludng why t s so mportant n the ratonalzaton of the lmtatons he puts on the knds of arguments we can rghtly deploy n argung for the coherency and plausblty of poltcal lberalsm. As background to ths, we need to note "two general facts about the publc culture of a democratc consttutonal regme: regmes whch promnently nclude a poltcal lberalsm. They are, first, the fact of reasonable pluralsm and second, the fact that ths dversty can be overcome only by the oppressve use of state power." 29 We need to ask why, f we just carefully, honestly, and persstently use wth one another all our farmndedness, all our ntellgence, and our good wll, we wll not nvarably end up n reasonable agreement. Why s what Kerkegaard called Socratsm, namely, the belef that all problems have a soluton f we just reason about them hard enough and carefully enough not true? Why are the ratonalstc assumptons that motvated ratonalst phlosophers from Plato to Spnoza not achevable? Why s such reasonable argument among phlosophers and other ntellectuals so motvated, not somethng that wll usually lead to agreement? Why s t that reasonable persons wth ntegrty, ntellgence, and good wll stll wll find agreement often so llusve over the above matters and matters lke them? Rawls's explanaton of ths s crucal for hs treatment of poltcal lberalsm and for the justficaton of the restrctons that, he has t, are to be made by lberals n poltcal arguments of the sort n whch he engages.
Reasonable persons, Rawls contends, are persons who have realzed what he calls ther two moral powers: namely, an understandng of and a capacty for justce, and an understandng of and a capacty to acheve ther own ratonal good. Wth such a realzaton of ther two moral powers, they, Rawls has t, are free and equal when they are n a consttutonal regme and "have an endurng desre to honour far terms of cooperaton and to be fully cooperatng members of socety."
30 They share, accordng to Rawls, a common human reason. That s to say they have "smlar powers of thought and judgment: they can draw nferences, wegh evdence and balance competng consderatons." 31 Yet, try as they wll, they often cannot reach agreement over ultmate or crucal matters. They have not been able to do t n the past, and there s precous lttle reason to beleve they wll be able to do t n the future.
It s here where Rawls's concepton of the burdens of judgment comes nto promnent play. We speak here of the sources and causes of dsagreement between reasonable persons, namely persons who have the two aspects of the reasonable person as basc aspects of ther vrtue as persons. The account of these burdens must be such that they are fully compatble wth, and so do not mpugn, the reasonableness of those who dsagree over such matters. They can and wll often dsagree, and contnue to dsagree, and stll reman equally reasonable by Rawls's minimal characterzaton of beng reasonable; any tghter standards of reasonablty would volate ther actng n accordance wth the burdens of judgment.
What are these burdens of judgment and why are they regarded as so mportant by Rawls? The "sources of reasonable dsagreement -the burdens of judgment -among reasonable persons are the many hazards nvolved n the correct and conscentous exercse of our powers of reason and judgment n the ordnary course of poltcal lfe." 32 Rawls goes on to remark: 
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As reasonable and ratonal we have to make dfferent knds of judgments. As ratonal we have to balance our varous ends and estmate ther approprate place n our way of lfe; and dong ths confronts us wth grave dfficultes n makng correct judgments of ratonalty. On the other hand, as reasonable we must assess the strength of peoples' clams, not only aganst our clams, but aganst one another, or on our common practces and nsttutons, all ths gvng rse to dfficultes n our makng sound reasonable judgments. In addton, there s the reasonable as t apples to our belefs and schemes of thought, or the reasonable as apprasng our use of our theoretcal (and not our moral and practcal) powers, and here too we meet the correspondng knds of dfficultes.
33
Rawls lsts the more obvous of these sources of reasonable dsagreement. They are all sources of dfficultes n arrvng at agreement n judgment and yet they are sources compatble wth those judgng beng n Rawls's minimal sense fully reasonable. Dsagreement n such contexts can, and typcally wll, be reasonable. They can ndeed even be compatble wth everyone's beng fully reasonable n Rawls's mnmal sense. The sx sources lsted by Rawls are as follows:
a. The evdence -emprcal and scentfic -bearng on the case s conflctng and complex, and thus hard to assess and evaluate.
b. Even where we agree fully about the knds of consderatons that are relevant, we may dsagree about ther weght, and so arrve at dfferent judgments.
c. To some extent all our concepts, and not only moral and poltcal concepts, are vague and subject to hard cases; and ths ndetermnacy means that we must rely on judgment and nterpretaton (and on judgments about nterpretatons) wthn some range (not sharply specfiable) where reasonable persons may dffer.
d. To some extent (how great we cannot tell) the way we assess evdence and wegh moral and poltcal values s shaped by our total experence, our whole course of lfe up to now; and our total experences must always dffer. Thus, n a modern socety wth ts numerous offices and postons, ts varous dvsons of labour, ts many socal groups and ther ethnc varety, ctzens' total experences are dsparate enough for ther judgments to dverge, at least to some degree, on many f not most cases of any sgnficant complexty.
e. Often there are dfferent knds of normatve consderatons of dfferent forces on both sdes of an ssue and t s dfficult to make an overall assessment.
f. Fnally, as we note n referrng to Berln's vew, any system of socal nsttutons s lmted n the values t can admt so that some selecton must be made from the full range of moral and poltcal values that mght be realzed. Ths s because any system of nsttutons has, as t were, a lmted socal space. In beng forced to select among chershed values, or when we hold to several and must restrct each n vew of the requrements of the others, we face great dfficultes n settng prortes and makng adjustments. Many hard decsons may seem to have no clear answer.
34
It s easy to see why, under such condtons, dsagreement among reasonable people wll obtan, and repeatedly obtan and to see as well how reasonable people wll often agree to disagree. As much as some of these matters over whch they dffer and agree to dffer mean to them, they wll be tolerant (hard as t may be sometmes) of even deeply dfferent and sometmes antagonstc vews. They wll be tolerant where those holdng such deeply dvergent vews from thers wll themselves be tolerant of other deeply dvergent vews ncludng thers. Rawls goes on to remark:
Relgous and phlosophcal doctrnes express vews of the world and of our lfe wth one another, severally and collectvely, as a whole. Our ndvdual and assocatve ponts of vew, ntellectual affintes, and affectve attachments, are too dverse, especally n a free socety, to enable those doctrnes to serve as the bass of lastng and reasoned poltcal agreements. Dfferent conceptons of the world can reasonably be elaborated from dfferent standponts and dversty arses n part from our dstnct perspectves. It s unrealstc -or worse, t arouses mutual suspcon and hostlty -to suppose that all our dfferences are rooted solely n gnorance and perversty, or else n the rvalres for power, status, or economc gan.
35
It s an nescapable fact that many of our most mportant judgments are made under condtons where t s not to be expected that conscentous persons wth full powers of reason, even after full and free dscusson, wll arrve at the same concluson. Socratsm or ratonalsm s smply not on the agenda. Some conflctng reasonable judgments (especally mportant are those belongng to people's comprehensve doctrnes) "may be true, others false; concevably all may be
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Wide Reflective Equilibria 235 false." 36 Indeed, I would add that some may arguably be ncoherent. But there wll be lttle agreement on whch of these thngs are whch. Rawls goes on to add the sgnficant poltcal lberal pont that "these burdens of judgment are of first sgnficance for a democratc deal of tolerance."
37
Remember that Rawls takes as the second part of beng reasonable "recognizing and being willing to bear the consequences of the burdens of judgment."
38 Ths s crucal for the way Rawls structures hs concepton of poltcal lberalsm and for the constrants requred of poltcal lberals over poltcal matters. However, reasonable persons, f they affirm any at all, affirm only reasonable comprehensve doctrnes. Reasonable comprehensve doctrnes for Rawls have three man features. Frstly, as an exercse of theoretcal reason a reasonable doctrne "organzes and characterzes recognzed values so they are compatble wth one another and express an ntellgble vew of the world."
39 Secondly, they also sngle out, each n ts own way, whch values are "to count as especally sgnficant and how to balance them when they conflct …." 40 In ths way there s also an exercse of practcal reason. Thrdly, a reasonable comprehensve doctrne "normally belongs to, or draws upon, a tradton of thought and doctrne," though from ths t does not follow that t s fixed and unchangng. 41 Tradtons, we need to remnd ourselves, normally change. And arguably they not only change, but also evolve and do not change arbtrarly and wthout explanaton.
42 Doctrnes wth these three features are present n "the major relgous, phlosophcal, and moral aspects of human lfe n a more or less consstent and coherent manner." 43 Rawls s centrally concerned wth not excludng doctrnes except where they are clearly ncompatble wth hs minimal concept of 'the reasonable' tself. "We," he puts t, "avod excludng doctrnes as unreasonable wthout strong grounds based on clear aspects of the reasonable tself." 44 The thng s to bend over backwards to avod beng arbtrary and exclusve and, above all, to avod beng partsan.
He then makes a set of remarks, ncludng a crucal but lttle notced remark n footnote 13 of page 50 n hs Political Liberalism, 45 that s crucal for the case I have been tryng to make about the compatblty of Rortyan-reasons and Rawlsan-reasons. In the passage wth whch I am prncpally concerned, Rawls remarks n the body of hs text, "Poltcal lberalsm counts many famlar and tradtonal doctrnes -relgous, phlosophcal, and moral -as reasonable even though we could not seriously entertain them for ourselves, as we thnk they gve excessve weght to some values and fal to allow for the sgnficance of others. A And we should recall that the ams are certan dstnctve poltcal ams, and these ams are to artculate a coherent concepton of poltcal lberalsm that all reasonable political liberals -reasonable n the mnmal sense that Rawls deploys for these purposes -can agree on even where they are holders of very dverse comprehensve doctrnes or no comprehensve doctrnes at all. Yet they must be vews that by Rawls's mnmal crteron of reasonablty count as reasonable. No strcter crteron can justfiably be nvoked for ths purpose. Ths s all we can expect or ndeed have and all we need to attan poltcal agreement among poltcal lberals n our present-day ntractably pluralst socetes. But ths s sufficent-or so Rawls argues-to attan cvlty and poltcal justce: deeply democratic poltcal justce n our socetes. And ths s hs am, and, keepng firmly to t, he stcks wth playng that language -game, adherng to the cluster of practces, we have characterzed hm as playng. But these are not the only ams, the only language-games, that poltcal lberals can play and play n the servce of poltcal lberalsm. Sometimes n some stuatons t s mportant, n poltcally argung, and ndeed poltcally argung about justce, to deploy a strcter crteron of reasonablty for poltcal justce.
I am thnkng here of places where we could and should use tghter standards than those we employ n the poltcal contexts Rawls s dscussng for the nternal justficaton of poltcal lberalsm. I conjecture that n hs footnote thrteen he was thnkng of dscussons n semnars, first class meda contexts, ntellectual debates n varous publc but non-state contexts and n prvate dscussons. In all of these contexts there s no queston of parlamentary, legal, or other governmental decsons beng taken. They can, of course, nfluence these decsons, but they are not part of the delberatve process where such decsons are made. Where such poltcal decsons are at ssue, at least n most such contexts, I thnk t s obvous that n a lberal socety or ndeed n any decent complex socety that Rawls's mnmal crteron of reasonablty should be adhered to. However, there are other publc dscussons and debates, such as those mentoned above, that are desgned to enlghten and not directly to lead to governmental or otherwse practcal decsons ether challengng or supportng the government. I thnk these publc dscussons should use a tghter crteron of reasonablty. I shall argue
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Wide Reflective Equilibria 237 that there are contexts, ndeed poltcal contexts, n whch tghter standards of reasonablty n dscussons or debates are n order. These mght very well nclude wrtngs, dscussons, debates that have an ndrect effect, and ndeed sometmes a relevant effect, on decsons taken n Parlament and the lke. However, when a vote s to be taken and the debate s n Parlament then Rawls's minimal crteron must -morally speakng 'must'-rule the day. The same s so for court decsons or state executve decsons. But n dscussons, wrtngs, debates leading up to the debate before the dscusson and votng n parlament, tghter crtera than what Rawls uses for poltcal lberalsm are often to be used. However, n the context of the actual debate n parlament concernng what governmental decson to make, the mnmal crteron of reasonablty must preval, along wth publc reason. Ths should be partly defintve of what s to count as beng a poltcally lberal socety. Dscussons n a semnar are one thng and debates n Parlament are another. The former should use a tghter crteron of reasonablty than the latter.
To llustrate the ratonale for what I have been clamng, we mght consder the proposal to make same-sex marrage part of the law of the land -a debate we have actually had n Canada n 2005 and South Afrcans had n ther country n 2006. But t could as well have been about aborton, drugs, contracepton, and n tmes past (or n places lke Chle, tme present) dvorce. But debates about same-sex marrage are current, often heated, and takng place not only n Canada and South Afrca but also n other lberal democraces. I shall use same-sex marrage as an example to make my pont concernng when for poltcal lberalsm a mnmal crteron/crtera of beng reasonable must be employed and when t should not, or at least need not.
Suppose a Parlamentaran speakng n parlament n such a debate gets utterly out of lne and says, 'We can by no means accept such gay and lesban cohabtaton as marrage, no matter how long and steady ther relatons have been, for homosexualty s a dsgustng, loathsome, and snful practce that can by no means be tolerated (not to speak of ts beng sanctfied by marrage). Homosexuals should be mprsoned or, f we can brng back the death penalty, executed. Burnng lesbans at the stake, though utopan, would not be napproprate.' Hs or her remarks -remember such a person s speakng n Parlament -should be firmly reproved and smply gnored n the subsequent debate n Parlament. But hs or her basc pont could be put n a mlder form. It s, after all, a hyped-up expresson of what by Rawls's own account, usng hs mnmal crteron of 'the reasonable,' s a reasonable comprehensve vew of the good even n present day poltcally lberal socetes. And remember Rawls remnds us that n "a partcular case someone may, of course, hold a reasonable doctrne n an unreasonable way …. That does not make the doctrne as such unreasonable. A reasonable doctrne s one that can be affirmed n a reasonable way."
48 Suppose another Member of Parlament [MP] wth the same general vews (homosexualty s aganst God's law) rses n Parlament to say that though hs colleague's expresson was, to put t mldly, explosve and to many deeply offensve, stll, after all, homosexualty s a sn aganst God's law and should not be acknowledged as somethng mor-ally acceptable, let alone sanctfied by somethng that the law beng voted on here would, f passed, publcly acknowledge, at least from a legal perspectve, homosexualty as beng morally acceptable. Hs vew, expressed n that way, s a vew that by Rawls's mnmal crteron would be regarded as part of what counts as a reasonable comprehensve vew. 49 Yet t would carry no weght wth most lberals. It would be regarded by many, perhaps most, people as an absurd and rather antque vew that we would be well to be wthout; n so reasonng they are at least mplctly usng a strcter crteron of reasonablty. But the second Parlamentaran's clam expressed as he put t could legtmately be entered nto the parlamentary debate usng the mnmal crteron. Though hs clam would have lttle weght wth hs more secular-mnded colleagues n debate over the proposed law, t stll should n turn be ponted out that t s not just a matter of a group of more or less secularly mnded poltcal lberals gangng up on certan relgous people; for the proposed law, f passed, would planly not force such a relgous person or hs church to accept, let alone practce, gay or lesban marrage. 'It's the law of the land,' they must acknowledge (f the bll s passed), but they need not (and ths s, of course, compatble wth the proposed law) become gays or lesbans or accept them n ther relgous communty and ther clergy need not marry them. To argue, as some mght, that they must f requested, marry them would volate the concepton of tolerance and respect for persons whch Rawls and whch lberals generally regard as central to lberalsm. Moreover, such antque vews expressed n the way the second orthodox relgous MP expressed them should be allowed nto the debate. But n a lberal ethos they would have lttle nfluence n parlamentary debate. Moreover, the MP and people wth hs mndset should be remnded that no one s beng requred or urged to be gay 49 John Rawls, "Idea of Publc Reason Revsted", n Freeman, supra note 10, 573 at 574-615.
Boran gnores ths dstncton between Phlosophy and phlosophy (See Boran, supra note 1). But I (pace her understandng of me) argue for an ant-Phlosophy phlosophy. (See Nelsen, "Ant-Phlosophy", supra note 12). I eschew Phlosophy (metaphyscs, epstemology, meta-ethcal theores, normatve ethcal theores, and normatve poltcal theores) not phlosophy wth ts reflectve and crtcal actvty, not as Boran puts t by sayng "that phlosophcal reflecton should be abandoned n order to be replaced by practcally vable forms of thnkng" (Boran, supra note 1 at 269). Surely the Sellars's concepton of phlosophy endorses a thorough reflectve orentaton. Moreover, t s somethng as old as the hlls and s not somethng that wth ant-Phlosophy phlosophy would or even should dsappear. It s Phlosophy that was under attack by me and by Rorty, not phlosophy. Neurath n good logcal postvst fashon dd not appeal to metaphyscal vews any more than dd Rawls n hs artculaton of poltcal lberalsm. The phlosophy Neurath appealed to and utlzed was phlosophy. What Boran calls normatve naturalsm s much the same, f not dentcal wth, what I have called socal naturalsm (Nelsen, Naturalism, supra note 12 at 25-55). Nether of these doctrnes s metaphyscal nor, I would argue, make epstemologcal clams. They all travel Phlosophcally lght whle remanng attempts to see how thngs n the broadest sense of the term hang together n the broadest sense of the term. Ths s certanly to be reflectve and to be reasonably systematcally so, but t need not, and n my vew should not, commt one to Phlosophy. In that way t remans deeply ant-Phlosophcal whle stll beng phlosophcal. Boran s rght n sayng that WRE s a procedure but WRE s also not wthout an appeal to substantve matters. After all, as Rawls uses t, and as I do, t collects together and utlzes consdered judgments. They are matters that are surely substantve. Rawls s nsghtful here n hs reply to Habermas. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, (New York: Columba Unversty Press, 2005) at 421-433.
Wide Reflective Equilibria 239 or lesban, no one n hs congregaton s beng requred to perform such marrages, gays and lesbans could even be expelled -or excommuncated -from the church of whch he/she s a member and 'true belevers' could shun ther company. But, as the argument goes, the legal rght to marry should be extended to such persons, and they should also have the rght to the same publc presence as other people, e.g., to teach, to practce medcne, to run for office, to themselves perform marrages f they are (as they can be) n a legal poston to do so and the lke. Such a relgous person may shun them, t s sad to contemplate, but they may not be publicly shunned: ther legal, poltcal, and socal status should reman the same as that of others. There s no possblty of that not beng so n a genunely lberal democracy. (Indeed ths s a matter of definton.) Moreover, there are many thngs we have a moral rght to do -such as shunnng them -that we should not do. So nothng s beng forced on the person wth such conservatve relgous vews except to accept, should the legslaton be passed, the equal legal, poltcal, and socal status of persons he dsapproves of because of ther partcular vews concernng homosexualty and because of ther own sexual orentaton. Persons who have not commtted any crme n what s acknowledged as such by law n the lberal socety of whch he or she s a member cannot be persecuted or legally dscrmnated aganst for havng the sexual orentaton they have.
To the response that homosexualty should be made a crme, the reply s that t s not a crme, at least n lberal socetes. And n socetes such as ours there s certanly no consensus on whether t should be made a crme, and to make t a crme, n any socety, would show contempt, or at least a lack of respect, for people wth a certan sexual orentaton and thus volate one of the deepest commtments of poltcal lberalsm, namely respect for persons (all persons) where they have done nothng to harm others. A poltcal lberal could not vote that t be made a crme and stll reman a poltcal lberal anymore than she could accept aparthed and be a poltcal lberal. It denes respect for persons whch s central to lberalsm.
Here, t might be argued, we have consderatons whch must be backed up wth tghter standards of reasonablty than Rawls wshes to deploy for hs nternal arguments for poltcal lberalsm. But t should n turn be repled that hs mnmal standards are sufficent for such an argument. They are consderatons that all lberals can rghtly acknowledge n the face of what actually comes to, even when not so ntended, an llberal assault on lberalsm.
Poltcal lberals are n all sorts of stuatons, where they have dfferent ends n vew than Rawls's, where they can make non-queston beggng arguments n response to llberal alternatves to lberalsm of an extensve range of topcs, e.g., ethnc natonalst or authortaran assaults. There s no place, n the face of such crtques, where we must say that nothng further can be relevantly sad and that our spades are turned and that s that. However, n spte of what I sad above, t looks lke there are places -emotonally charged places such as gay-marrage and aborton -where perhaps poltcal lberals cannot, when pushed, proceed just n terms of Rawls's mnmal account of reasonablty but must appeal to tghter standards. Ths seems to be so even n parlamentary debate where publc reason should rule the day and even more obvously so n the publc forum of cvl so-cety n argung the case for legalzng gay marrage. Arguably, there s over such ssues sometmes, perhaps even often, a need to appeal to a tghter crteron.
I want to argue now that ths s not so evdent as t mght at first seem. Let us go back to our moderate, mld mannered, perhaps just small -conservatve parlamentaran. He remnds us that homosexualty s a sn. However, becomng more conclatory, he remnds us -and more approprately -that t s so regarded n hs church -a church whch has many members, some of whom regard themselves as poltcal lberals -qute unequvocally taken to be a sn. Suppose n parlamentary debate a secular-mnded Russell-admrng MP, followng Russell, remarks that 'sn' s not a term that s a part of hs vocabulary or conceptual scheme. The mld mannered conservatve retorts that for many sncere, conscentous, and sometmes even reflectve relgous belevers, 'sn' s very much a part of ther vocabulary; and there are even certan denomnatons -Catholc, some Protestant, some Jewsh and Muslm -that regard homosexualty as a sn; and for some denomnatons ther adherents must beleve t to be a sn on pan of apostasy. (Of course, for the Russellan MP, 'apostasy' wll also not be a part of hs vocabulary.) To the queston 'Why t s snful?' the mld mannered but orthodox belever wll retort that t harms people and rends the fabrc of socety by makng lfe unstable, undermnng the famly and famly values.
The debate, f not n the Parlament then at least n the parlamentary restaurant, wll go on probably n predctable ways. The defender of the acceptablty of homosexualty and of the proposed law that gays and lesbans be gven same-sex marrage rghts wll argue that homosexualty does not harm people or at least that there s no good evdence that t does, but what clearly does harm people s dscrmnaton, non-recognton, excluson, and not to be afforded equal ctzenshp rghts or human rghts. Ths n turn wll generate the response that t does harm people n other ways. It mpedes ther psycho-sexual development. Instead of gong for treatment, homosexuals, beng accepted n socety, may even come to be role models for some. Some chldren, findng them as role models, may have ther psycho-sexual development mpeded. The moderately orthodox relgous MP, f he s reasonably knowledgeable, may pont out that even some psychoanalysts, hers (among other thngs) of Freud's firm athesm, thnk that homosexualty s harmful, makng t mpossble for homosexuals to have a 'gental personalty' and thus makng t mpossble for them to become mature, or at least optmally mature, persons.
Most secularly mnded persons (and ndeed some relgous persons) wll thnk ths all nonsense and ndeed harmful nonsense. However, mndful of the burdens of judgment, our Russellan MP mght say to hs mldly orthodox conservatve colleague, 'Look you and I are not gong to agree about homosexualty, and, most partcularly, that t s a good thng that the nsttuton of marrage be extended to homosexuals, but we do agree about the deep democratc and lberal value of people beng treated wth equal respect. That s a deeply shared element n our common lberal vew. Just as blacks and whtes were not treated wth equal respect under aparthed or Jewsh and Arab-Israel ctzens are not beng treated wth equal respect n Israel, so homosexuals and b-sexual ctzens n our socety are not treated wth equal respect and do not, where the proposed law s not passed, even have equal rghts. And you and I as democrats and poltcal
Wide Reflective Equilibria 241 lberals cannot accept that.' The moderate conservatve lberal-leanng MP may rather reluctantly come to accept that argument just as some lberal Catholcs have so reacted to the aborton debate. And, f that s so, debate can be conducted and settled n terms of Rawlsan mnmalsm, WRE, and an appeal to publc reason.
However, faced wth the above argument, the conservatve, but stll poltcally lberal, belever, may stffen hs back and respond, 'As much as I care about equal respect for people and equal ctzenshp rghts and lberal democracy, I wll not -ndeed morally speakng I cannot -set asde or go aganst the ex cathedra proclamaton of my church, now frozen nto doctrne, namely that homosexualty s a sn, anathema to my fath, whch requres that homosexualty, a grave sn, must be categorcally rejected and never sanctfied legally or otherwse. I agree that that doctrne does undermne equal self-respect and equal ctzenshp. That deeply dstresses me. But the Pontff speakng ex cathedra condemns homosexualty and gay marrage categorcally. I must beleve as a Catholc that what s so proclamed s absolutely true and categorcally must be accepted and must be acted n accordance wth. I cannot keep my fath and reject that. And my fath s of overwhelmng mportance to me. My spade s turned. I can do no other.' The Russellan MP may feel that hs spade s turned too. He may very well feel that there s no more room for further argument and dscusson. But he can also see that the conservatve MP s actng n good fath and s, by Rawls's mnmal crteron of reasonablty, beng reasonable.
If dalogue s to go on -f they are to get ther spades out of the ground -t seems at least that they can no longer rely just on Rawlsan reasons, whch travel phlosophcally lght. They have to turn to consderng challengeable and deeply challenged world-vews. But n a stronger sense of 'reasonable' these thngs can and should be argued. However, perhaps surprsngly and perhaps counter-ntutvely, I shall argue that ths s not so. I do not deny that, n a stronger sense of 'reasonable,' that these thngs can be argued. What I deny s that, for political and legal purposes n a poltcally lberal socety, they need to be and should be so argued. We can and should stck wth our mnmal crteron of 'reasonable.' Am I just stampng my feet?
However, there reman two consderatons that should be faced. The first one fits wth the overall argument I have been tryng to make and the second one ends n a jarrng note that I take to rase mportant consderatons to whch I do not yet (perhaps I never wll) know how to respond. The first consderaton clams that the moderate but orthodox belever, wshng to be a poltcal lberal, cannot be one, or at least cannot be a consstent one, f he takes the turn I have just put n hs mouth. However, he cannot, t s beng clamed, consstently be a poltcal lberal and have the fath he has. He must choose to be consstent. As mportant as lberal values are to hm, he (gven hs fath) s commtted and beleves he must reman commtted to allowng ex cathedra relgous doctrnes to overrde hs poltcally lberal belefs where they conflct. He, that s, abandons hs poltcal lberalsm where t comes (as t sometmes does) nto conflct wth such doctrnes of hs fath. He cannot be a consstent poltcal lberal and have the fath he has. However, ths s not true f he accepts, wthn the bounds of poltcal lberalsm, a democratc vote to be overrdng even when t runs aganst what hs fath deeply commts hm to do. Hs so actng democratcally (acceptng the vote) does not requre hm personally to approve of gay marrage or to go aganst anythng whch the Pope says when he s speakng ex cathedra. Rather, he s free to accept the vote, n a poltcally lberal parlament, whle remanng free to contnue to dssent. He contnues to thnk the Parlament has made a grave mstake. But he finally bows, as all democrats must, to the wll of the majorty where a clear volaton of human rghts s not at ssue. 50 But he keeps fathful to hs own conscence and hs own personal way of vewng thngs and respondng to them, e.g., a Catholc prest wll not marry gays but accepts, f so goes the vote, that t s the legtmate law of the land and that others may do so. (Is ths to say, when push comes to shove, democracy s to outwegh any relgous orentaton? For a lberal, yes. Is ths just stampng one's feet for lberalsm? )
The second observaton s the more glarng and jarrng one gven my account. Suppose a relgous person (whle remanng devoutly relgous) accepts certan key poltcal matters (e.g., same-sex marrage) as vald legslaton when t gets a majorty vote n legslature. She accepts ths, let us further suppose, as trumpng in that domain whatever her fath categorcally commts her to. Can, gven her fath, she consstently do so? I have come rather ambvalently to thnk so. However, even f she can consstently do so, and that s what a poltcally lberal democratc socety comes to requre, wll t not then be the case -ndeed cannot but be the case -that n a deeply pluralstc, modern, extensvely secular lberal socety, wth ts embedded poltcal lberalsm, that relgous vews, where they st uneasly wth the orentaton of such a socety (as they do), wll be margnalzed? (But to be margnalzed s not to be excluded.)
Central as such relgous convctons are for the fathful to such a relgous orentaton and no matter how much they are a part of the web of (poltcally speakng) the lves of these relgous persons, they wll have to be trumped n a poltcally lberal socety, and ndeed nescapably, where they conflct wth what s central to poltcal lberalsm and ental a polcy (as they do) whch s n deep conflct wth t. Ths s ndeed crucal for poltcal lberalsm. But s ths not, when all s sad and done, f that ever s so, to just insist on poltcal lberalsm -a knd of stampng one's feet -and s not that tself not to show respect for such relgous persons? Maybe thngs are more complcated than I have made them out to be? Or than Rawls takes them to be? And does ths not make dfficultes n WRE when t s taken as a method for ratonalzng poltcal lberalsm?
Maybe we need some foundatonal belefs? And ndeed, where there s more than one, for them to be herarchcally or lexcally ordered. But can that be To sum up, Rawls and Rorty both, and I as well, are concerned to defend poltcal lberalsm and, n dong so, to deploy WRE. 51 All three of us thnk that n engagng n that task, we should set asde metaphyscal, epstemologcal theores and any attachment, at least where poltcal lberalsm s at ssue, to any partcular comprehensve theory of the good. We want n that respect to travel Phlosophcally lght. In employng WRE all three of us consstently stck wth ts basc procedures. We sometmes n defendng poltcal lberalsm appeal to dfferent substantve consderatons -dfferent reasons -n equlbratng and we have partally dfferent ams n defendng t. These reasons are thought not only to be dfferent but some thnk they are conflctng. Ths I argue s mstaken because our dfferent WREs are constructed for dfferent purposes. Rawls seeks to gve an internal justficaton for poltcal lberalsm by showng how ts consdered convctons and belefs consstently and coherently (f ths does not come to the same thng) hang together. Rorty and I seek that too. But we also seek to gve an external justficaton for poltcal lberalsm by gvng reasons that challenge the counter clams of llberal (as well as other non-lberal poltcal accounts) and, as well, gve addtonal reasons other than those showng consstency and coherency for poltcal lberalsm that challenge non-lberal vews. Rawls shows how poltcal lberalsm, whch has often been thought to nvolve conflctng clams, can be artculated n such a manner as to show that t s 51 I should add parenthetcally, so as to not confuse people who know my work, though I wll not try to explan t here, that ths s perfectly compatble wth my socalsm. I have at tmes, somewhat paradoxcally, but as I see t perfectly consstently, characterzed myself as 'a lberal communst.' a coherent and attractve vew that can make sense of the most fundamental consdered convctons of poltcal lberals as well as many others. It can be set out wthout conflctng vews. He does not try to show how those non-lberal consdered convctons that conflct wth those poltcally lberal consdered convctons -substantve and not purely procedural convctons-can be responded to by poltcal lberals other than by beng gnored. Both Rorty and I argue that t s mportant to show the superorty of poltcal lberalsm to llberal and other non-lberal vews and how we can use WRE to do so n a way that s dfferent from, though non-conflctng, wth Rawls's poston. Rawls, n short, gves an nternal justficaton of poltcal lberalsm whle Rorty and I gve as well an external justficaton of poltcal lberalsm. Both are legtmate even f dfferent actvtes. But nether are sufficent wthout the other for a thorough defense of poltcal lberalsm.
V. ADDENDUM
One of my anonymous referees argued that Rawls, by showng that poltcal lberalsm s nternally coherent -can overcome certan nternal tensons such as a belef that we cannot have both autonomy and equalty does make a contrbuton to answerng llberals snce one of the reasons for not acceptng poltcal lberalsm s the belef that there s, and can be, no coherent poltcal lberalsm: that some of the tensons n poltcal lberalsm come to contradctons. If Rawls has shown, that poltcal lberalsm can be characterzed such that t s a coherent poston, then one famlar reason for rejectng poltcal lberalsm and adoptng a non -lberal poston has been undermned. The llberal can no longer clam that poltcal lberalsm s to be rejected, because t has been shown to be contradctory or ncoherent.
I thnk ths pont s mportant and well taken. However, t only dsposes of one argument for rejectng poltcal lberalsm. An llberal -say, an authortaran mertocrat -could accept the coherence (consstency) of poltcal lberalsm and respond that ts man dfficulty s not ts coherence but that t rests on manfestly, absurdly false premses. It, for example, beleves, and ndeed centrally, n human equalty and equal respect for all people. But, an llberal wll mantan, people are clearly unequal. There are people, as Sarkosy put t, who get up early and work hard and contrbute somethng to ther socety and then there are the couch potatoes or the chaps who go to the bar as soon as t opens and stay for hours chewng over wth ther mates the local news and gossp. The authortaran mertocrat wll say, reflectng on examples lke that, examples whch abound, 'Don't talk to me about the equal worth of people or that all humans, just by beng human, deserve equal respect. Just look around and see how people are.' I thnk such clams need to be answered and can, ndeed rather easly, be answered. I have attempted to answer them.
52 But the pont s that they need to be answered. There are a multtude of such arguments avalable to the llberal or or, less polemcally n Rawls's case, by usng the method of avodance Rawls, eschewed Phlosophy n defendng poltcal lberalsm. Ths s what I had n mnd by appealng to reflectve commonsense, as Moore and Perce dd at certan junctures. I dd ths n deployng WRE. And to do ths was to appeal to somethng substantve and not just procedural or methodologcal. So n Clam 1, so understood, I do not volate Rawls's constrants concernng any appeal to a Clam 1. So understood, I do not ether volate Rawls's constrants concernng any appeal to a Phlosophcal theory to reject all Phlosophcal theores nor am I caught n the self-contradcton objecton. Moreover, to appeal to commonsense here s to appeal to a substantve vew and to clam, á la Moore, of ths defense of commonsense, that t s more certan than any Phlosophcal vew that mght oppose t. That s to say we can be more confident that bolng babes s extremely evl than any Phlosophcal, or for that matter phlosophcal, theory or actvty used to deny, queston, or defend t, just as we can be more confident that the world has exsted for many years past than we can be of any theory concernng the external world. 2. Consderng the referee's second clam, t s perfectly true that Netzsche was a non-foundatonalst and a fierce -ndeed powerful -crtc of lberalsm. So were, though not as paradgmatcally, Kerkegaard and those thnkers characterzed by Isaah Berln as thnkers of the counter-enlghtenment, ncludng the romantc counter-enlghtenment. The short of t s that I never clamed nor mpled, nor gave to understand that all lberals were non-foundatonalsts and all non-lberals were foundatonalsts. On the lberal sde, both John Stuart Mll and Kant were foundatonalsts and, to come down to our tme, C. I. Lews, Curt Ducasse, and Roderck Chsholm were lberals and foundatonalsts. The crucal thng that I am clamng concernng these matters s that poltcal lberalsm as well as non-lberalsm can be non-foundatonalst and wthout (even mplctly) any commtment to any acknowledged or even unacknowledged employment of foundatonalst vews. 3. I accept 3. Indeed, I would emphasze t. But ths rather Rortyan move puts me, t mght well be sad, n conflct wth Rawls. Let us, for short, call 3 a commtment to hstorcsm. But would not Rawls regard t as another metaphyscal (controversal phlosophcal vew) that he, for the purposes of artculatng and defendng poltcal lberalsm, would avod? I thnk he would, but he should not. Let me explan. Lke Rorty, 57 I regard Rawls hmself, from at least hs Dewey lectures,
